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Abstract
This paper considers dynamic bilateral trade with short-term commitment. We
show that, when the seller is more patient than the buyer, there exist systematic
differences between the optimal selling and renting mechanisms. While the former
consists of simple price-posting, the latter induces the buyer to choose between a
secure- and a random-delivery contract. Allowing for mechanisms more general
than price-posting reduces the seller’s cost of learning the buyer’s valuation in the
renting case. Renting leads to more learning than selling but (unless the horizon is
sufficiently long) only when general mechanisms are available. Our results contrast
with the common view that the restriction to price-posting is innocuous and that
informational asymmetries are more persistent under renting than under selling.
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1 Introduction
In one of the most fundamental economic transactions, a monopolistic seller offers an in-
divisible durable product to a single (non-anonymous) buyer whose valuation constitutes
his private information. An important insight of the literature on dynamic adverse selec-
tion holds that the seller’s inability to commit to the future terms of trade represents an
obstacle for learning. Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) and Sobel and Takahashi (1983) show
that, without commitment, the seller will offer a decreasing sequence of prices, inducing
him to learn the buyer’s type only gradually. When the product is rented rather than
sold, informational asymmetries turn out to be even more persistent. Hart and Tirole
(1988) argue that, due to the so-called ratchet effect, the seller cannot do better than
by offering a rental price so low as to prevent himself from learning anything about the
buyer’s type for most of the time horizon.1
More recent results suggest that allowing for more sophisticated mechanisms than
simple price posting does not alter these conclusions. Indeed, using a selling model with a
continuum of types, Skreta (2006) finds that price-posting constitutes the seller’s optimal
selling mechanism. In this paper, we argue that in the renting case, learning can be
improved by use of a mechanism whose outcome is not implementable via simple price-
posting. In particular, we show that if general mechanisms are available, the seller’s
optimal renting mechanism is random and induces more learning than the seller’s optimal
selling mechanism. These results come at a surprise as they contrast with the view,
suggested by the existing literature, that the restriction to price-posting is innocuous and
that informational asymmetries are more persistent under renting than under selling.
Our setting resembles Hart and Tirole’s (1988) seminal model of dynamic bilateral
trade with short-term commitment. In each of a finite number of periods, the buyer has a
1A similar conclusion is obtained by the dynamic incentive models of Laffont and Tirole (1987,1988)
which bear a certain resemblance to the renting framework of Hart and Tirole (1988). They show that
full separation is not feasible (for a continuum of types) or might be dominated by pooling (for a binary
type).
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unit demand for the seller’s product. The buyer’s per-period valuation can be either high
or low and remains constant across periods. Our analysis encompasses both the renting
and the selling case. While in the former, the seller offers his product to the buyer in
every period, in the latter the interaction ends once a delivery has taken place. We differ
from Hart and Tirole (1988) in that we choose a general mechanism design approach.2
At the start of each period, the seller commits to a mechanism which, due to his lack of
long-term commitment, must be optimal given his (potentially updated) belief about the
buyer’s type. A mechanism specifies a probability with which the product is delivered
to the buyer and a transfer from the buyer to the seller, both conditional on the buyer’s
message.
Our analysis focuses on the case where the seller is more patient than the buyer. From
a theoretical perspective, this case turns out to be the interesting one to consider. It is
relevant from an applied viewpoint because in many markets sellers (firms) adopt a more
long-term perspective or have access to cheaper credit than buyers (consumers).3
Applying the revelation principle of Bester and Strausz (2001), we find that with a
patient seller there exists a range of (moderate) prior beliefs for which the seller induces
the buyer to separate (in the first period) although pooling would be optimal in a static
context. The reason for this result is straightforward and the same as in the price-posting
models of Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) and Sobel and Takahashi (1983). When the seller
is more patient, information about the buyer’s type is more valuable to the seller than to
the buyer, giving the seller an incentive to separate types even at the cost of a sub-optimal
2Their model allows for general mechanisms in the analysis of long-term contracting with renegotiation,
but in their treatment of the non-commitment case they “restrict attention to deterministic offers” (Hart
and Tirole (1988), p.512).
3Although a common assumption in bargaining models (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), Sobel
and Takahashi (1983)), the literature on dynamic mechanism design has abstracted from heterogeneous
discounting. Heterogeneous discounting makes dynamic contracting problems ill-defined when parties
are able to commit to inter-temporal transfers (Krähmer and Strausz, 2015). In order to facilitate
comparisons with the commitment case (as in Hart and Tirole, 1988), the literature has maintained the
assumption of homogeneous discounting even when, as in this paper, parties are unable to commit to
future payments.
3
allocation.
Perhaps surprisingly, heterogeneous discounting generates systematic differences be-
tween the optimal renting and selling mechanisms that are absent when discount factors
are the same. In particular, we find that the optimal renting mechanism consists of a
menu containing a secure-delivery and a random-delivery contract whereas the optimal
selling mechanism can be implemented through simple price-posting. Allowing the seller
to offer random contracts can lead to a significant increase of more than 10% in the seller’s
payoff from renting relative to what he can achieve by simple price-posting (see Figure
1).4
To understand why random contracts are optimal in the renting setting, an important
insight is that the presence of the ratchet effect requires the low type’s (probability of)
trade to fall short of the high type’s trade by a strictly positive amount, for separation to be
feasible.5 Hence, when the seller chooses to separate, he will set the low type’s likelihood
of delivery equal to its upper bound, resulting in an outcome that is unattainable through
simple price-posting. By doing so, the seller minimizes his loss from implementing a sub-
optimal trade with the low type. Random-delivery contracts are useful in the renting case
because they allow the seller to elicit the buyer’s type without excluding low valuation
buyers from trade altogether. This can be understood most easily in the limiting case
of a myopic buyer. In this case, the ratchet effect vanishes and separation is achievable
through a menu with the low type’s probability of delivery chosen smaller but arbitrarily
close to one. With a myopic buyer, random contracts allow the seller to learn the buyer’s
type at negligible cost.
When we compare renting and selling with respect to payoffs, a straightforward but
4In reality, the seller may induce randomness into his contracts by conditioning on exogenous stochastic
events. For example, maintenance contracts for IT or other industrial equipment often restrict their
service to weekdays (as opposed to 24/7). If a breakdown occurs on a weekend the buyer of the service
derives no value from the contract.
5It will become clear that this requirement, reminiscent of the monotonicity constraint in the static
context, is necessary to induce both types of buyers to reveal their type truthfully (with positive proba-
bility).
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important observation is that for a patient seller, renting is preferable over selling. The
simple reason is that selling requires the seller to charge the buyer for the future use of his
product upfront. The dominance of renting over selling for a patient seller implies that
we have identified price-posting as sub-optimal in a situation where it actually matters.
In particular, when a seller is free to choose between renting and selling and general
mechanisms are available, then our model predicts that mechanisms more sophisticated
than simple price-posting will be observed (for some parameter values).
Our analysis concludes with a comparison between renting and selling with respect to
the persistence of informational asymmetries. We find that the range of priors for which
the seller pools both types of buyer for the entire trade-horizon is smaller under renting
than under selling. Notably, (for short horizons) this conclusion hinges on the availability
of random contracts. When the seller is restricted to simple price-posting, the result is
reversed, i.e., renting leads to more pooling than selling. This result is driven by the fact
that, under renting, learning is not only more beneficial but also more costly than under
selling. Allowing for general mechanisms lowers the costs of learning in the renting case,
making learning become more desirable than under selling. This finding highlights the
importance of allowing for general mechanisms in models of dynamic bilateral trade with
short-term commitment.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Following a discussion of the related literature and
the description of the model (Section 2) we provide a motivating example (Section 3) that
serves to highlight our subsequent results. Section 4 posits the seller’s general mechanism
design problems for the renting and the selling case. We derive the corresponding reduced
programs, containing the dynamic equivalent of the monotonicity constraint, familiar from
the static case. In Section 5 we characterize and compare the seller’s optimal renting and
selling mechanisms when there are only two periods of (potential) trade. The two-period
case serves as the starting point for our inductive analysis of the general case contained
in Section 6. Section 6, besides proving robustness, serves to highlight the optimality of
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a novel kind of semi-separating mechanism that emerges in the renting case when there
are more than two periods of trade. This mechanism prevents the seller’s belief about
the buyer’s type from becoming too optimistic too early, allowing the seller to distribute
his learning across periods. While our analysis focuses on the (more interesting) case of a
soft seller, characterized by a low prior belief about the buyer’s type, we have confirmed
that our main insight that renting reveals more information than selling survives when
the seller is tough.
Related literature
This paper contributes to the literature on dynamic adverse selection, initiated by the
regulation model of Freixas et al. (1985). A common theme in this literature is that,
in the absence of long-term commitment, the ratchet effect obstructs information from
being revealed (e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1988). While it may not be surprising that the
buyer’s impatience mitigates the ratchet effect, the key observation of our paper is that
heterogeneous discounting induces renting contracts to be random whereas in a selling
framework price-posting remains optimal.
The random allocation of an indivisible product can be interpreted as the supply of an
interior quantity of a divisible good. This connects our paper to the models of dynamic
adverse selection with continuous allocations, pioneered by Laffont and Tirole (1990).
This literature challenges the view that separation requires commitment. If the seller
can offer different quantities of his product, time ceases to be the only screening variable
available. Wang (1998) recognizes that with the help of an additional screening variable, a
seller may not suffer from his inability to commit to future offers as conjectured by Coase
(1972). By offering a menu of contracts specifying differing quantities, the seller can
separate the buyer without delay. In the unique sequential equilibrium of Wang’s infinite
horizon model, full and immediate separation results from the offer of the optimal static
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screening menu in the first period.6 In our model, heterogeneous discounting changes
the relative slope of the players’ iso-utility curves across periods, encouraging the parties
to “trade information inter-temporally”.7 As a consequence, separation via “quantity”
emerges in a dynamic context, even when the optimal static contract would pool the buyer
by offering the same (non-random) allocation to both types. Under renting, quantity is
a more effective screening variable than under selling, because the inefficiency resulting
from the downward distortion of the low type’s quantity is restricted to the current period.
Whether quantity can substitute for time as a screening device is less clear when
contracts are subject to renegotiation. In particular, the seller and the buyer may find
it mutually beneficial to increase quantity towards its efficient level once the seller has
learned the buyer’s type. Maestri (2017) and Strulovici (2017) show that the possibility of
renegotiation erodes the seller’s ability to screen the buyer and restores efficient allocations
in the limit as negotiation-frictions vanish. While in our selling model “renegotiation” only
happens when the product failed to be allocated to the buyer, in our renting model a new
“quantity” is negotiated in every period due to the seller’s lack of long-term commitment.
In this sense, there exists more opportunity for renegotiation under renting than under
selling and our result that (for longer horizons) semi-separation arises as a feature of the
optimal renting mechanism resonates well with the literature on dynamic contracting with
renegotiation.
Random delivery contracts have been shown to be useful as a screening device in several
related but distinct frameworks. Thanassoulis (2004) shows that it may be optimal for
the seller of two substitute goods to offer his customers a product lottery inducing the
delivery of a random product. Buyers with large differences in their valuations are willing
to pay a higher price for obtaining their desired product with certainty. Manelli and
6Gerardi and Maestri (2016) find immediate and full information revelation in an infinite horizon
model where in each period the informed party has the choice between staying in the relationship or
leaving forever to claim an outside option.
7We are grateful to the anonymous associate editor for pointing out this analogy.
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Vincent (2007) and Pavlov (2011) extend this insight to the case of an arbitrary number
of (not necessarily substitute) products where, besides randomness, bundling can play a
role. A new feature that arises when products are not substitutes is the introduction of
uncertainty not only about the identity of the delivered product but also about whether
or not a delivery takes place at all. This is the kind of randomness we find to be optimal in
our setting. However, as explained nicely by Hart and Reny (2015), randomness arises in
these settings precisely because of the existence of multiple products. In our setting with
a single product, random mechanisms turn out to be optimal because trade is dynamic
rather than static.
Finally, our model allows for the interpretation of random-delivery contracts as “dam-
aged products” in the spirit of Deneckere and McAfee (1996). This connects our model
to the literature on monopolistic screening with a quality dimension initiated by Mussa
and Rosen (1978). The special feature of our model is that the “costs” of supplying dif-
ferent levels of quality are the same (zero) for all qualities below a certain maximum. It
is important to note that with this cost structure, intermediate levels of quality cannot
be part of the seller’s optimal static menu. In our setting, the randomness of the optimal
contract is an intimate consequence of the dynamic nature of contracting.
2 Model
We consider a buyer and a seller who interact for N ≥ 2 periods. The seller offers
an indivisible durable product and the buyer has a unitary demand. For simplicity, we
abstract from production costs.8 Our model distinguishes between two cases. In the
renting case, the product is allocated to the buyer for only one period at a time. In the
selling case, the product is allocated to the buyer for all remaining periods.
The buyer’s (per-period) valuation of the good, θ, is constant across periods. It can
8All results remain valid when the seller has a constant unit cost of production sufficiently small for
trade to be efficient independently of the buyer’s valuation.
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take a high value normalized to θH = 1 or a low value θL ∈ (0, 1). For brevity we define
∆θ ≡ 1−θL. The buyer’s valuation θ constitutes his private information and will therefore
be denoted as his type. We let β ∈ (0, 1) be the seller’s (prior) belief about the buyer’s
probability of having a high type. Our analysis focuses on the case where, in the language
of Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), the seller is soft. A soft seller, being characterized by a
sufficiently low prior, β < θL, would sell to both types of buyer at a low price if there was
only one period of trade.9
If in any given period, the buyer makes a transfer t to the seller then the buyer’s
(instantaneous) payoff is given by θ − t if the product is allocated to him. If the product
is not allocated to the buyer during that period, his payoff is given by −t. The seller’s
(instantaneous) payoff is equal to his revenue t. Buyer and seller discount future payoffs
with discount factors δB ∈ (0, 1) and δS ∈ (0, 1), respectively. We focus on the case where
the seller is more patient than the buyer by assuming that δS > δB. It will become clear
below that, in our setting, δS > δB represents the “interesting case”, whereas for δS ≤ δB
the model’s predictions remain the same as under homogeneous discounting. Moreover,
we will see that, in the renting case, (full) separation is not feasible when the buyer values
future payoffs too strongly (see explanation following Lemma 1). In order to study the
optimality of separation in a setting where separation is feasible we make the following:
Assumption 1.
N−1
∑
n=1
δnB < 1. (1)
Note that Assumption 1 holds for all N when δB <
1
2
and is automatically satisfied
for N = 2.
While earlier articles on dynamic adverse selection have analyzed settings with long-
term commitment, the focus of the literature has shifted to the (more realistic but also
9For a tough seller, β ≥ θL, the optimal mechanisms are qualitatively identical to the homogeneous
discounting case. In particular, as we will argue in Section 5, price-posting is optimal both under renting
and selling. See also footnote 10.
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more complicated) case in which no such commitment is available. We follow this tendency
by assuming that, in any given period, the seller can commit to the “terms of trade” for
that period but cannot commit to the future “terms of trade”. Using Perfect Bayesian
Equilibium as our solution concept, this assumption implies that the seller’s offer in any
period must be (sequentially) optimal given the trading history up to that period.
Besides our assumption of short-term commitment, we put no restrictions on the way
in which the seller and the buyer interact. In particular, we do not restrict attention
to the possibility that the seller may simply post a price for his product. Instead, we
use a mechanism design approach to determine the seller’s revenue maximizing strategy.
Following Bester and Strausz (2001), we can assume without loss of generality, that in
any given period the seller offers a direct mechanism in which the buyer is asked to report
his type and, conditional on his message m ∈ {l, h}, the mechanism specifies an outcome
consisting of a transfer tm ∈ ℜ from the buyer to the seller and a likelihood xm ∈ [0, 1]
with which the product is allocated to the buyer. We say that a mechanism’s outcome
can be implemented by price-posting when xl, xh ∈ {0, 1} and there exists a price p such
that tm = pxm for any m ∈ {l, h}.
3 Motivating example
In this section we motivate our subsequent analysis by way of an example. The example
focuses on the renting case in order to demonstrate the usefulness of random-delivery
contracts. It assumes that there are N = 2 periods of trade and that the seller believes
the buyer’s valuation for his product to be θH = 1 with probability β = 30% and θL = 1/2
with probability 1 − β = 70%. The seller’s discount factor is assumed to be given by
δS =
3
4
, whereas the buyer’s discount factor is δB =
1
4
.
Suppose first that the seller’s strategy consists of posting a price in each period. If he
posts a low price p = 1/2 in period 1, it will be accepted by both types. In this case, the
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seller learns nothing from his observation of the buyer’s first period behavior and given
his prior he optimally chooses p = 1/2 again in period 2. Following this strategy, the
seller’s payoff is 1/2 + 3
4
· 1/2 = 7/8.
Alternatively, the seller may post a high price in period 1 that is accepted only by the
high type. As this allows the seller to learn the buyer’s type, the seller will set the period
2 price equal to the buyer’s true valuation. In order to make the high type accept in
period 1 the seller has to compensate him for facing a high price p = 1 rather than a low
price p = 1/2 in period 2 by charging p = 1− 1
4
(1−1/2) = 7/8 in period 1. Following this
strategy, the seller’s payoff is 30% · (7/8 + 3
4
· 1) + 70% · 3
4
· 1/2 = 6/8 < 7/8. Hence when
the seller’s strategy is restricted to simple price-posting, he will refrain from inducing the
buyer to reveal his type.
What if we allow the seller to use more sophisticated renting mechanisms? Consider
the possibility that in period 1 the seller offers the buyer the following choice: Make a
transfer of th = 1/2 and obtain the product with probability xh = 1 or make a smaller
transfer of tl = 3/8 and obtain the product only with probability xl = 0.75. This menu
makes it optimal for the high and the low type to choose secure- and random-delivery
respectively. To see that the high type buyer has no incentive to pool with the low type
note that his payoff from random-delivery 0.75 · 1− 3/8 + 1
4
(1− 1/2) is just the same as
his payoff from secure-delivery 1 − 1/2 = 1/2. The seller’s payoff is 30% · (1/2 + 3
4
· 1) +
70% · (3/8 + 3
4
· 1/2) = 72/80 > 7/8. Hence, when we allow for general mechanisms, the
seller will no longer refrain from inducing the buyer to reveal his type. Random renting
contracts allow the seller to induce the separation of types at a lower cost.
4 The mechanism design problem
Due to the dynamic nature of our trade setting, the seller may update his belief about
the buyer’s type from the observation of the buyer’s past behavior. Since the buyer
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adjusts his behavior accordingly, the design of the optimal mechanism requires the seller
to take account of the mechanism’s effect on information revelation. This distinguishes
the dynamic setting from a static framework in which seller and buyer interact only once.
Bester and Strausz (2001) have shown that, in a dynamic setting the revelation prin-
ciple does not restrain the buyer to reveal his true type truthfully but only requires that
he does so with a strictly positive probability. We denote by qL ∈ [0, 1) and qH ∈ (0, 1]
the probabilities with which the high type and the low type report the message m = h re-
spectively. If the seller induces the buyer to use the reporting strategy (qL, qH) by offering
the menu {(xl, tl), (xh, th)} his updated beliefs conditional on the buyer having reported
message h or l are given by
βh ≡
βqH
βqH + (1− β)qL
and βl ≡
β(1− qH)
1− βqH − (1− β)qL
. (2)
Note that since messages can be renamed we can assume without loss of generality that
βh ≥ β ≥ βl or equivalently qH ≥ qL. In a separating mechanism both types of buyer
report their type truthfully (qL = 0, qH = 1), allowing the seller to determine with
certainty whether the buyer has a high or a low valuation. In contrast, in a pooling
mechanism, qL = qH , and the seller’s updated belief remains equal to his prior. Finally, a
semi-separating mechanism elicits some but not all of the buyer’s information, inducing
posterior beliefs (βl, βh) 6∈ {(0, 1), (β, β)}.
In the following we denote by VK(βm), U
H
K (βm), and U
L
K(βm) the seller’s and the
buyer’s continuation values when there are K periods of trade remaining and the seller’s
belief about the buyer’s type is given by βm.
Consider the renting problem when there are 2 ≤ K ≤ N periods of trade remaining
and the seller’s belief is β ∈ (0, 1). Given that we can write the buyer’s (ex ante) likelihood
to report message h as βqH+(1−β)qL =
β−βl
βh−βl
the optimal renting mechanism must solve
the following
12
Renting Program:
max
xl,xh,tl,th,βl,βh
β − βl
βh − βl
[th + δSVK−1(βh)] +
βh − β
βh − βl
[tl + δSVK−1(βl)] (3)
subject to
xh − th + δBU
H
K−1(βh) ≥ xl − tl + δBU
H
K−1(βl) (4)
θLxl − tl + δBU
L
K−1(βl) ≥ θLxh − th + δBU
L
K−1(βh) (5)
xh − th + δBU
H
K−1(βh) ≥ 0 (6)
θLxl − tl + δBU
L
K−1(βl) ≥ 0. (7)
The constraints (4) and (5) are the dynamic incentive constraints of the high and the
low type, respectively. These constraints have to hold with equality whenever the seller
wishes to induce the buyer to misreport his type with positive probability. That is, (4)
must hold with equality when qH < 1 ⇔ βL > 0 and (5) must hold with equality when
qL > 0 ⇔ βh < 1. The constraints (6) and (7) are the corresponding participation
constraints.
The selling case differs from the renting case in that, upon delivery, trade terminates
and the buyer derives utility from the seller’s product in all remaining periods. Abbre-
viating notation by letting σK ≡
∑K−1
n=0 δ
n
B the optimal selling mechanism must solve the
following
Selling Program:
max
xl,xh,tl,th,βl,βh
β − βl
βh − βl
[th + (1− xh)δSVK−1(βh)] +
βh − β
βh − βl
[tl + (1− xl)δSVK−1(βl)] (8)
subject to
xhσK − th + (1− xh)δBU
H
K−1(βh) ≥ xlσK − tl + (1− xl)δBU
H
K−1(βl) (9)
xlσKθL − tl + (1− xl)δBU
L
K−1(βl) ≥ xhσKθL − th + (1− xh)δBU
L
K−1(βh) (10)
xhσK − th + (1− xh)δBU
H
K−1(βh) ≥ 0 (11)
xlσKθL − tl + (1− xl)δBU
L
K−1(βl) ≥ 0. (12)
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Again, the dynamic incentive constraints (9) and (10) must hold with equality when
qH < 1 ⇔ βL > 0 and qL > 0 ⇔ βh < 1, respectively.
The following lemma is obtained via the steps that are commonly employed in the
analysis of the corresponding static problems, i.e., it uses the fact that the participation
constraint of the high type is redundant whereas the participation constraint of the low
type and the incentive constraint of the high type must be binding at the optimum:
Lemma 1. With K periods of trade remaining and the seller’s belief given by β ∈ (0, 1),
the seller’s optimal mechanism sets x∗h = 1 and chooses xl, βl, βh to solve the following
• Reduced Renting Program:
maxxl,βl,βh xlθL +
βh − β
βh − βl
δSVK−1(βl) (13)
+
β − βl
βh − βl
{
1− xl − δB[U
H
K−1(βl)− U
H
K−1(βh)] + δSVK−1(βh)
}
subject to
xl ≤ 1−
δB
∆θ
[UHK−1(βl)− U
H
K−1(βh)] with eq. if βh < 1. (14)
• Reduced Selling Program:
maxxl,βl,βh xlθLσK +
βh − β
βh − βl
(1− xl)δSVK−1(βl) (15)
+
β − βl
βh − βl
(1− xl)[σK − δBU
H
K−1(βl)]
subject to
xl ≤ 1 with eq. if βh < 1. (16)
Proof : See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 shows that independently of the mode of trade, the seller’s optimal mech-
anism offers the maximum possible allocation xh = 1 to the high type buyer. This is
familiar from the static setting and follows from the fact that an increase in xh raises
the seller’s objective while simultaneously relaxing the constraints. Trading with the high
14
type is beneficial because it creates surplus while simultaneously improving the seller’s
ability to elicit the buyer’s type.
The lemma also reveals an important difference between renting and selling. Note that
in the renting case, the dynamic monotonicity constraint (14) is more demanding than
in the selling case (16). This difference is due to the ratchet effect. In the renting case,
the existence of future information rents for the high type drives a wedge between the
incentive compatible allocations requiring them not only to be monotonically increasing
in the reported type but to differ from each other by a strictly positive amount. To
understand the origin of this constraint, note from (4) and (5) that the transfer difference
th− tl has to be smaller than xh−xl−δB[U
H
K−1(βl)−U
H
K−1(βh)] for the high type to prefer
(xh, th) but larger than (xh − xl)θL − δB[U
L
K−1(βl)− U
L
K−1(βh)] for the low type to prefer
(xl, tl). For U
H
K−1(βl)−U
H
K−1(βh) > U
L
K−1(βl)−U
L
K−1(βh) = 0 this is possible only when the
allocations xh and xl are sufficiently different. Assumption 1 guarantees that xl, xh ∈ [0, 1]
can be chosen sufficiently different for (full) separation of types to be achievable. In
particular, it follows from 0 ≤ UHK−1(βl)−U
H
K−1(βh) ≤ U
H
K−1(0)−U
H
K−1(1) = ∆θσK−1 and
Assumption 1 that the RHS of (14) is strictly positive (for details see the proof of Lemma
1).
Lemma 1 states properties of the optimal renting and selling mechanism that hold
independently of the specific nature of the corresponding continuation values. With only
one period to go, the distinction between renting and selling ceases to exist and from the
well-established solution of the static problem we know that continuation values are given
by:
V1(βm) = max{θL, βm} (17)
UH1 (βm) =



0 if βm > θL
0 or ∆θ if βm = θL
∆θ if βm < θL
(18)
UL1 (βm) = 0. (19)
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In the following section we solve the reduced programs in Lemma 1 using (17) and (18) to
obtain a complete characterization of the optimal renting and selling mechanisms for the
case where N = 2. This characterization will serve as the starting point for our inductive
analysis of the general case N ≥ 2 in Section 6.
5 The optimal mechanism for N = 2
In this section we characterize the optimal renting and selling mechanisms when there are
only two potential periods of trade. Our determination of the optimal mechanism in this
section is simplified by the insight, shown formally in the proof of Propositions 1 and 2,
that for N = 2 and β < θL, the seller cannot benefit from the use of a semi-separating
mechanism. Semi-separation can be optimal only when it substitutes for the seller’s lack
of commitment to maintain a high price (which requires the seller to be tough - see Hart
and Tirole (1988)) or when it helps to distribute the revelation of the buyer’s type across
time (which requires at least three periods - see Section 6).
5.1 Renting
We first state our result and then explain its intuition.
Proposition 1. Let N = 2. In the renting case, the seller’s revenue is maximized by
choosing a (first-period) mechanism with the following characteristics:
• Pooling: For β ∈ (0, βR2 ] the seller posts a rental-price p
∗ = θL which is accepted by
both types of buyer.
• Separation: For β ∈ (βR2 , θL) the seller offers a menu consisting of a random-delivery
contract (x∗l , t
∗
l ) = (1 − δB, (1 − δB)θL) and a secure-delivery contract (x
∗
h, t
∗
h) =
(1, θL) inducing the high and the low type to choose secure- and random-delivery
respectively.
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The threshold is given by βR2 ≡
δBθL
δS−(δS−δB)θL
∈ (0, θL). If the seller is restricted to price-
posting, he will separate in a strictly smaller interval of priors (βRPP2 , θL) where β
RPP
2 =
θL
1+(δS−δB)∆θ
∈ (βR2 , θL).
Proof : See the Appendix.
To understand this result, first consider the mechanism that is optimal amongst all
separating mechanism. Substitution of βl = 0, βh = 1, and the one-period continuation
values in (17) and (18) simplifies the reduced renting program in Lemma 1 further to:
max
xl∈[0,1−δB ]
β[1− xl∆θ] + (1− β)xlθL + δSθL + β(δS − δB)∆θ. (20)
Notice that, except for the constraint on xl and the constant part of the objective, this
program is identical to the static (one-period) program. As the seller is soft, β < θL, he
would therefore like to choose the likelihood of delivery to the low type, xl, as high as
possible. However, in the dynamic setting, separation of types requires xl not to exceed
the threshold 1 − δB. Hence, the seller’s optimal separating mechanism is random, i.e.,
xl = 1− δB.
10
Comparing the seller’s optimized payoff from separating, obtained by substitution of
x∗l = 1− δB into (20), with his payoff from pooling, (1 + δS)θL, we find that separation is
optimal if and only if
βδS∆θ > βδB∆θ + {θL − β[1− x
∗
l∆θ]− (1− β)x
∗
l θL} . (21)
This inequality compares the benefits (LHS) and costs (RHS) from inducing the buyer to
reveal his type in period 1. The benefits originate from the fact that without separation,
the seller would charge a low price to a high type in period 2 whereas he can charge a
10 A tough seller, β ≥ θL, would choose xl as low as possible by setting xl = 0. Hence, for a tough
seller, a restriction to price posting is innocuous. Heterogeneous discounting adds nothing (qualitatively)
new to the standard analysis of the tough seller case contained in Chapter 9 of Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005). The only difference is that, with a patient seller, the interval of priors for which the seller chooses
separation rather than semi-separation becomes larger. We have confirmed that, in line with our main
results, renting leads to more separation than selling also in the tough seller case. Details are available
on request.
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high price if he knows the buyer’s type to be high. The costs consist of the compensation
that the high type must receive to give up his future information rent, plus the period
1 misallocation that is necessary to separate types. The term in parentheses is positive
since, in the dynamic setting, separation requires the seller to restrict his trade with the
low type although his prior would favor pooling if the setting was static. For δS > δB,
separation can be optimal in the dynamic context, because the seller’s gain from obtaining
information about the buyer’s type (δS∆θ) is larger than the buyer’s loss from revealing
this information (δB∆θ). Separation is optimal when the seller’s prior is sufficiently close
to θL because in this case the cost of a suboptimal period 1 allocation becomes negligible.
Finally, note that for β ∈ (βR2 , θL), the outcome of the mechanism that induces sep-
aration optimally cannot be replicated by price-posting. When the seller is restricted to
price-posting, he must set xl = 0 and separation becomes less profitable because it comes
at the cost of a larger first-period misallocation. As a consequence, the range of priors for
which separation dominates pooling becomes smaller. It is in this sense that allowing the
seller to choose more general mechanisms increases his ability to elicit the buyer’s type in
the renting case.
Proposition 1 contrasts with the view, suggested by the existing literature on dynamic
bilateral trade with short-term commitment, that the restriction to price-posting is in-
nocuous. If the seller is more patient than the buyer then there exists a non-empty range
of priors for which price-posting ceases to be optimal in the renting case. It is intuitive
and follows immediately from βR2 that this range increases when discounting becomes
more heterogeneous.
5.2 Selling
Again, we first state our result and then explain its intuition.
Proposition 2. Let N = 2. In the selling case, the seller’s optimal (first-period) mecha-
nism consists of price-posting:
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• Pooling: For β ∈ (0, βS2 ] the seller posts a price p
∗ = (1 + δB)θL which is accepted
by both types of buyer.
• Separation: For β ∈ (βS2 , θL) the seller posts a price p
∗ = 1+ δBθL which is accepted
by the high type but rejected by the low type.
The threshold is given by βS2 ≡
1−(δS−δB)
1−(δS−δB)θL
θL ∈ (0, θL).
To understand this result, first consider the possibility that the seller uses a separating
mechanisms. Setting βl = 0 and βh = 1 in the reduced selling program in Lemma 1 leaves
the seller with the following problem:
max
xl∈[0,1]
(1− xl)[β(1 + δBθL) + (1− β)δSθL] + (1 + δB)xlθL. (22)
Note that due to the absence of the ratchet effect, the selling-program places no further
constraint on the seller’s choice of xl. Together with the linearity of the seller’s program
this implies that x∗l ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., price-posting must be optimal. Setting xl = 1 attains
the payoff of a pooling mechanism. Hence it remains to compare the payoff from pooling
with the payoff from separating with xl = 0. Separation is optimal if and only if
βδS∆θ − β(δS − δB)∆θ > βδB∆θ + {θL − β − (1− β)(δS − δB)θL} . (23)
Similar to the renting case, this inequality compares the benefits (LHS) and costs (RHS)
of separation. Again, the costs of separation originate from the compensation necessary
to induce the high type to reveal his information and from the loss of not serving the low
type in period 1 (in parentheses). The benefits of separation are lower than in the renting
case, because of the absence of the ratchet effect. Only in the renting case, the seller is able
to extract the additional rent β(δS − δB)∆θ due to his higher level of patience. However,
in the selling case, separation also comes at a different cost. The costs of separation
are reduced by the fact that the exclusion of the low type from first period trade gives
rise to the opportunity of a second period sale. Selling the second-period access to the
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seller’s product to the low valuation buyer in period 2 rather than in period 1 creates the
additional payoff (δS − δB)θL when the seller is more patient than the buyer.
Using a selling model with an arbitrary number of periods and a continuum of types,
Skreta (2006) shows that price-posting is optimal when the seller and the buyer have
equal discount factors. Proposition 2 shows that, in a model with two periods and two
types, this insight remains valid when discount factors differ. Heterogeneous discounting
only affects the prices charged. In particular, when the seller is more patient than the
buyer, then for moderate priors, the seller will separate types by charging a high price in
period 1 whereas under homogeneous discounting both types would be served at a low
price.
5.3 Comparison
It is well known that, in a model with two periods, renting and selling lead to the same
outcome when the seller’s and the buyer’s discount factors are identical (see Chapter 9
in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)). When the seller is more patient than the buyer, a
trivial difference is that renting results in higher revenue than selling. This can be seen
in Figure 1 which plots a numerical example comparing the seller’s revenue under renting
and selling in dependence of the seller’s prior. Renting dominates selling because it allows
the patient seller to “sell” the second period access to his product in period 2 rather than
in period 1.
Our analysis in this section shows that, besides its effect on the seller’s revenue, het-
erogeneous discounting introduces further, non-trivial differences between renting and
selling. The first difference that arises from a simple comparison of Propositions 1 and 2
is that renting may require a more sophisticated, random contract than the simple price-
posting characterizing the optimal selling mechanism. The reason for this difference is
that in the renting case the existence of future information rents drives a wedge between
the incentive compatible first period trades, whereas in the selling case the ratchet effect
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Figure 1: Revenue in Dependence of the Seller’s Prior. The figure compares
revenue from renting with revenue from selling. In the renting case, revenue is depicted
with (dotted) and without (solid) the restriction to price-posting. Note that allowing
for general mechanisms can increase the seller’s revenue from renting by more than 10%.
Parameters are θL = 0.5, δS = 0.75 and δB = 0.25.
has no bite. This difference matters under heterogeneous but not under homogeneous
discounting because a patient seller may prefer separation even when implementing the
same trade with both types is optimal from a static viewpoint.
More importantly, Propositions 1 and 2 also allow us to compare renting and sell-
ing with respect to the amount of information that becomes revealed. In particular, a
comparison of the intervals of priors for which separation occurs gives us the following:
Corollary 1. Let N = 2. Under renting the seller’s optimal mechanism induces more sep-
aration than under selling, i.e., βR2 < β
S
2 . The opposite holds when the seller is restricted
to price-posting, i.e., βRPP2 > β
S
2 .
Proof: See the Appendix.
The result is pictured in Figure 2. There we depict the range of prior beliefs for
which the optimal mechanism induces the buyer to reveal (completely) his type. The case
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Figure 2: The Optimal Mechanism for N = 2. The case of homogeneous discounting,
δS = δB serves as a benchmark. When the seller is more patient than the buyer, selling
and renting differ with respect to the degree of information revelation, and the comparison
depends on whether or not general mechanisms are available.
of homogeneous discounting serves as a benchmark. Under homogeneous discounting,
renting and selling are equivalent and the optimal mechanism pools the buyer’s types
for all priors β < θL. Allowing for heterogeneous discounting shows that, generically,
renting and selling are different. Renting leads to more learning than selling but only
when general mechanisms are available.
The intuition for Corollary 1 can be obtained from a comparison of the benefits and
the costs of separation under the two modes of trade. Consider first the case where the
seller is restricted to simple price-posting. Setting xl = 0 in (21) and comparing with (23)
we see that selling reduces the costs of separation by (δS − δB)(θL − βθL) while lowering
the benefits of separation by only (δS − δB)(β − βθL). In other words, when the seller
is restricted to price posting, the elimination of the ratchet effect through selling rather
than renting improves the seller’s ability to learn the buyer’s type. Allowing the seller to
use general mechanisms reverses the cost-benefit comparison in the favor of renting, by
lowering the costs of separation in the renting case. With the help of a random-delivery,
the seller can achieve separation under renting without excluding the low type buyer from
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first period trade altogether. When this effect is taken into account, the seller’s incentive
to separate is stronger under renting than under selling.
6 Arbitrary number of periods N ≥ 2
The characterization of the optimal mechanisms for the two-period model contained in the
previous section serves as the starting point for an inductive analysis of the general case
with an arbitrary number of periods. In this section, we show that the two main insights
of the two-period case remain valid: With N ≥ 2 periods of trade, renting involves the
use of a random mechanism and leads to less pooling than selling. A new feature of the
model with more than two periods is the emergence of a novel kind of semi-separating
mechanism. Instead of substituting for the seller’s lack of commitment to a high price (well
known from Hart and Tirole’s (1988) analysis of the tough seller’s case), with a soft seller
semi-separating mechanisms serve the purpose of distributing/delaying type-revelation
across periods and turn out to be optimal for moderate priors.
6.1 Robustness
The following two results are the N -period analogs of Propositions 1 and 2. Their proof
is by induction over the number of periods and is based on the intuition explained in the
previous section.
Proposition 3. In the renting case, there exist thresholds βRN < β
R
N−1 < · · · < β
R
2 < β
R
1 =
θL such that with 2 ≤ K ≤ N periods of trade remaining and the seller’s belief given by
β ∈ [0, θL) the following holds:
• Pooling: For β ∈ [0, βRK ] the seller posts a rental-price p
∗ = θL in all K remaining
periods and both types of buyer accept.
• Separation or Semi-Separation: For β ∈ (βRK , β
R
K−1] the seller offers a menu consist-
ing of a random-delivery contract xl ∈ (0, 1) and a secure-delivery contract xh = 1.
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The high type chooses secure-delivery whereas the low type is induced to choose
random-delivery or to mix.
Proposition 4. In the selling case, there exist thresholds βSN < β
S
N−1 < · · · < β
S
2 < β
S
1 =
θL such that with 2 ≤ K ≤ N periods remaining and the seller’s belief given by β ∈ [0, θL),
the seller’s optimal selling mechanism consists of price-posting:
• Pooling: For β ∈ [0, βSK ] the seller posts the price θLσK which is accepted by both
types of buyer.
• Separation: For β ∈ (βSK , β
S
K−1] the seller posts the price σK − δB∆θσK−1 which
is accepted by the high type but rejected by the low type. For β > βSK−1 separation
might not be optimal but dominates pooling.
Besides the potential emergence of semi-separation in the renting case (discussed be-
low), Propositions 3 and 4 differ from the two-period case in that they only provide a
partial characterization of the seller’s optimal mechanism. In particular, with K periods
to go, the optimal mechanism is determined only for a subset (0, βK−1) of the seller’s
priors. However, the fact that for K = 1, 2, . . . , N these subsets cover the entire range of
priors [0, θL) allows us to obtain the following result about a (soft) seller’s propensity to
elicit the buyer’s type in a dynamic trade-setting:
Corollary 2. Consider the range of priors [0, βN ] for which the seller pools both types of
buyer during all N periods of trade. Allowing for mechanisms more general than price-
posting reduces pooling (only) in the renting case, i.e., [0, βRN ] ⊂ [0, β
RPP
N ]. With an
infinite horizon, renting leads to less pooling than selling, i.e., [0, βR
∞
] ⊂ [0, βS
∞
]. If δS ∈
(δB,
1−δB
1−δN−1
B
] then [0, βRN ] ⊂ [0, β
S
N ] independently of N .
The corollary’s first claim is immediate from Proposition 3 which shows that, in the
renting case, the seller’s optimal separating mechanism involves a random allocation. A
restriction to price-posting therefore decreases the seller’s payoffs from separation, making
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pooling relatively more attractive. In the selling case a restriction to price-posting has no
effect because, as shown by Proposition 4, price-posting constitutes the seller’s optimal
way to separate the buyer’s types.
To understand why, in the renting case, βRN serves as the boundary of the pooling range,
note from Propositions 3 that for β ∈ [0, βRN ] pooling in all N periods is optimal for the
seller. For β 6∈ [0, βRN ], there exists a K ≤ N such that after pooling for N −K periods,
separation or semi-separation becomes optimal (because the number of remaining periods
has decreased from N to K whereas β has remained unchanged). Hence for β 6∈ [0, βRN ],
pooling for all N periods cannot be optimal.
Corollary 2 complements Corollary 1 in showing that renting leads to more information-
revelation than selling (in the sense defined in the corollary), not only with a short (N = 2)
but also with a long (N = ∞) horizon. The comparison between renting and selling for
a general N is complicated by the fact that for N > 2 we can only determine an upper
bound on the threshold βRN (see proof of Corollary 2). However, under the additional
assumption that the seller is not too patient, we are able to show that renting leads to
less pooling than selling independently of the length of the horizon N .11 The difference
with respect to the two period model, is that for general N , random mechanisms, al-
though optimal, may cease to be necessary for our conclusion that renting leads to more
information-revelation than selling. This happens when the time horizon is sufficiently
long. In particular, for an infinite horizon we find that renting leads to less pooling than
selling even under the restriction to price-posting, i.e., [0, βRPP
∞
] ⊂ [0, βS
∞
] .
6.2 Novel features
Our result that renting leads to less pooling than selling comes at a surprise in light of the
existing literature. Hart and Tirole’s (1988) Proposition 3 has shown that in a renting
11Assumption 1 guarantees that the set of discount factors (δB ,
1−δB
1−δ
N−1
B
] contained in Corollary 2 is
non-empty.
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framework with a tough seller, homogeneous discounting, and price-posting, the buyer’s
information may become revealed only during the final periods of trade. Their result
relies on the assumption that the buyer’s discount factor is greater than one half, which
guarantees that, with a sufficient number of periods remaining, the seller is unable to
induce the high type to reveal his information by accepting a price above the low type’s
valuation (see our explanation of dynamic incentive compatibility following Lemma 1).
In our setting, the buyer’s discount factor has been assumed to be small enough for such
separation to be feasible right from the start. In spite of our finding that, when feasible,
separation turns out to be optimal for a larger range of priors than in the selling case, there
exists a sense in which Hart and Tirole’s insight about renting being cursed by “delayed
type-revelation” remains valid. In the following we consider a simple three-period example
to highlight this point.
Let N = 3 and consider a renting mechanism which offers the menu
(xl, tl) = (1− δ
2
B, (1− δ
2
B)θL) and (xh, th) = (1, θL) (24)
inducing the posteriors βl = 0 and βh = θL. Using Proposition 1 to calculate the cor-
responding continuation payoffs V2(βm) and U
H
2 (βm), the seller’s payoff from using this
semi-separating mechanism is readily determined from (13):
V semi = θL + δSθL + (δ
2
S − δ
2
B)θL + β[δ
2
B + δS(δS − δB)∆θ]. (25)
Comparison with the payoffs from pooling, V pool = θL(1 + δS + δ
2
S), and separation,
V sep = θL + (1− β)θL(δS − δB + δ
2
S − δ
2
B) + β(δS + δ
2
S), reveals that this semi-separating
mechanism dominates pooling and separation when
β >
δ2BθL
δ2B + δS(δS − δB)∆θ
and β <
δBθL
(1 + δB)[δS − (δS − δB)θL]− δ2B
(26)
respectively. There exist priors β that satisfy both of these inequalities when δS > δB(1+
δB). Semi-separation constitutes a “compromise” between pooling and (full) separation
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which turns out to be optimal for moderate values of the seller’s prior.12 It induces the
buyer to reveal his type only partially, before becoming fully separated in the next period.
The seller delays the revelation of the buyer’s type because his prior is too optimistic to
pool but not optimistic enough to immediately separate the buyer. With a soft seller,
semi-separation serves as a means to distribute information-rents across trading-periods.
This distinguishes the above mechanism from the semi-separating mechanisms commonly
found to be optimal in models with a tough seller. A tough seller restricts his learning
in order to maintain tough, whereas a soft seller restricts his learning to prevent himself
from becoming tough too early. While the former requires βl > 0 or equivalently qH < 1,
for the latter it has to hold that βh < 1 or equivalently qL > 0. In other words, with
a tough seller, semi-separation induces type-misrepresentation by the high type whereas
with a soft seller, it is the low type who is allowed to misrepresent.13 These features of
the seller’s optimal mechanism are non-existent for N = 2 because with only two periods
of trade all (potential) learning is restricted to a single occasion.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have applied a mechanism design approach to a model of dynamic bi-
lateral trade with short-term commitment. Our analysis encompasses both the renting
and the selling case. Allowing the seller to be more patient than the buyer reveals two
differences between these alternative modes of trade which become overlooked under the
simplifying assumption of homogeneous discounting. First, the optimal renting mecha-
nism involves a menu containing a secure- and a random-delivery contract whereas the
outcome of the optimal selling mechanism can be implemented via simple price-posting.
12Proving optimality of the mechanism in (24) requires further comparisons with alternative semi-
separating mechanisms. We have confirmed that there exist parameters for which the mechanism in (24)
constitutes the seller’s optimal mechanism.
13In our semi-separating mechanism, the seller becomes progressively optimistic about the buyer’s type
or learns that his type is low. This contrasts with the sequential separating dynamics of Maestri’s (2017)
renegotiation equilibria where the seller’s posterior about the buyer’s type decreases unless he finds out
that the buyer’s type is high.
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Second, renting induces the buyer to reveal his type for a wider range or parameters than
selling. Both results contrast with the view suggested by the existing literature which
holds that the restriction to price-posting is innocuous and that informational asymme-
tries are more persistent under renting than under selling. The fact that our second result
relies on the availability of a random-delivery contract underlines the importance of a
general mechanism design approach for models of dynamic adverse selection.
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Appendix - Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: This proof has three steps. Only the last step requires the dis-
tinction between renting and selling. (i) The participation constraint for the high type is
redundant: As θL < θH = 1 and U
H
K−1(βl) ≥ U
L
K−1(βl), (4) and (7) together imply (6),
and (9) and (12) together imply (11) . (ii) The participation constraint of the low type
and the incentive constraint of the high type are binding at the optimum: If (7) or (12)
holds with strict inequality then there exists an ǫ > 0 such that raising both transfers to
tl + ǫ and th + ǫ increases the seller’s revenue while keeping all constraints satisfied. If (4)
or (9) holds with strict inequality then there exists an ǫ > 0 such that raising the transfer
for the buyer reporting a high type to th+ ǫ increases the seller’s revenue while keeping all
constraints satisfied. (iii) To show that x∗h = 1 consider renting and selling in separation:
Renting: As (4) and (7) are binding we can substitute t∗l = xlθL + δBU
L
K−1(βl) and
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t∗h = t
∗
l + xh − xl + δB[U
H
K−1(βh)− U
H
K−1(βl)] into (8) to make the objective equal to
θLxl + δBU
L
K−1(βl) +
βh − β
βh − βl
δSVK−1(βl) (27)
+
β − βl
βh − βl
{
xh − xl + δB[U
H
K−1(βh)− U
H
K−1(βl)] + δSVK−1(βh)
}
Substitution of t∗l and t
∗
h into the remaining constraint (5) gives
(xh − xl)
∆θ
δB
≥ [UHK−1(βl)− U
H
K−1(βh)]− [U
L
K−1(βl)− U
L
K−1(βh)]. (28)
Because an increase in xh raises the objective in (27) while relaxing the constraint in (28),
setting x∗h = 1 must maximize the seller’s payoff. Substitution of xh = 1 and U
L
K−1 = 0
(which holds because, as shown above, the participation constraint of the low type must
be binding in every period) into (27) and (28) leads to the reduced renting program.
Note that the constraint (14) together with the fact that xl ≥ 0 requires that U
H
K−1(βl)−
UHK−1(βh) ≤
∆θ
δB
. This means that if UHK−1(0)− U
H
K−1(1) >
∆θ
δB
⇔
∑K
n=1 δ
n
B > 1 then there
exists an upper bound on the degree of separation that can be induced. Our assumption
that
∑N
n=1 δ
n
B < 1 implies that no such bound exist for any K ≤ N , i.e., full separation
is always feasible. Intuitively, δB is assumed to be sufficiently small, such that the (high
type) buyer can be induced to give up his future information rent via the threat of a
decrease in the current period’s probability of delivery from xh = 1 to xl ∈ (0, 1).
Selling: As (9) and (12) are binding we can substitute t∗l = xlσKθL+(1−xl)δBU
L
K−1(βl)
and t∗h = t
∗
l + (xh − xl)σK + (1 − xh)δBU
H
K−1(βh) − (1 − xl)δBU
H
K−1(βl) into (8) to make
the objective equal to
θLxlσK + (1− xl)δBU
L
K−1(βl) +
βh − β
βh − βl
(1− xl)δSVK−1(βl)(29)
+
β − βl
βh − βl
{
(xh − xl)σK + (1− xh)[δBU
H
K−1(βh) + δSVK−1(βh)]− (1− xl)δBU
H
K−1(βl)
}
.
As δBU
H
K−1(βh)+δSVK−1(βh) < σK the modified objective is increasing in xh. Substitution
of t∗l and t
∗
h into the remaining constraint (10) gives
(xh − xl)
∆θσK
δB
≥ (1− xl)[U
H
K−1(βl)− U
L
K−1(βl)]− (1− xh)[U
H
K−1(βh)− U
L
K−1(βh)]. (30)
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As δB[U
H
K−1(βh)− U
L
K−1(βh)] < ∆θσK , an increase in xh relaxes this constraint. Because
an increase in xh raises the objective while relaxing the constraint, setting x
∗
h = 1 must
be optimal. Substituting x∗h = 1 and U
L
K−1 = 0 into (29) gives the objective in (15).
Moreover, for x∗h = 1, (30) is always satisfied and holds with equality if and only if xl = 1.
Hence, in order to induce βh < 1 the seller has to choose xl = 1.
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2: The comparison of the payoffs from pooling (βl =
βh = β) and separation (βl = 0, βh = 1) is contained in the main text. It remains to
show that no mechanism can give the seller a higher revenue than what he can achieve
by either pooling or separating:
Renting : Consider a mechanism for which βh ∈ (θL, 1). Continuation values are then
UH1 (βl) = ∆θ, U
H
1 (βh) = 0, V1(βh) = βh, and V1(βl) = θL. Moreover, (14) must be
binding and we can substitute xl = 1 − δB into the reduced renting program (13) which
leaves us with the simplified problem:
max
βl∈[0,β],βh∈(θL,1)
(1− δB)θL +
βh − β
βh − βl
δSθL +
β − βl
βh − βl
(δBθL + δSβh). (31)
Since (31) is decreasing in βl for all βH , setting βl = 0 must be optimal. The resulting
payoff θL[1 + (δS − δB)(1 −
β
βh
)] + βδS is increasing in βh, i.e., letting βh → 1 must be
optimal. Now consider a mechanism with βh ≤ θL. Continuation values are U
H
1 (βl) =
UH1 (βh) = ∆θ, and V1(βh) = V1(βl) = θL.
14 As (14) must be binding, xl = 1, the seller’s
revenue becomes equal to (1 + δS)θL independently of the induced beliefs, i.e., setting
βl = βh = β must be optimal. We have therefore shown that no renting mechanism can
give the seller a higher payoff than what he gets by either separating or pooling.
Selling : For βh < 1, the constraint (16) of the reduced selling program must bind
and the objective (15) becomes equal to the pooling payoff (1 + δB)θL. For βh = 1, the
linearity of the seller’s program in xl implies that xl ∈ {0, 1}. Setting xl = 1 again leads
14For βh = θL the seller is indifferent between pooling and separating in period 2. Hence he can
credibly promise to pool in period 2 , i.e., UH
1
(βh) = ∆θ, in order to reduce the buyer’s reluctance to
reveal his type.
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the pooling payoff. For xl = 0 it remains to solve
max
βl∈[0,β]
β − βl
1− βl
(1 + δBθL) +
1− β
1− βl
δSθL (32)
where we have used the fact that βl ≤ β < θL and hence U
H
1 (βl) = ∆θ and V1(βl) = θL.
As the objective in (32) is decreasing in βl, setting βl = 0 is optimal. We have therefore
shown that no selling mechanism can give the seller a higher payoff than what he gets by
either separating or pooling.
Proof of Corollary 1: Note that βR2 < β
S
2 if and only if
δB[1− (δS − δB)θL] < [1− (δS − δB)][δS − (δS − δB)θL] ⇔ 0 < (1− δS)∆θ. (33)
Also note that βRPP2 > β
S
2 if and only if
⇔ 1− (δS − δB)θL > [1− (δS − δB)][1 + (δS − δB)∆θ] ⇔ 0 > −(δS − δB)
2∆θ. (34)
This proves the comparative statics contained in Corollary 1.
Proof of Proposition 3: By induction over the number of periods N . Our analysis of
the two-period model has shown that for N = 2 the seller’s optimal mechanism satisfies
the properties described in Proposition 3. Assume that Proposition 3 holds for N −1 and
consider the seller’s choice of mechanism when there are N period and the seller’s belief
β is such that β < βRN−1. In analogy to σN =
∑N−1
n=0 δ
n
B define σ
S
N ≡
∑N−1
n=0 δ
n
S.
Starting point is the reduced renting program in Lemma 1 with K = N . First note
that for βh = 1 the objective is (linearly) increasing in xl if and only if
−
β − βl
1 − βl
∆θ + (1−
β − βl
1− βl
)θL > 0 ⇔ βl >
β − θL
∆θ
(35)
which is satisfied for all βl ∈ [0, β] because β < β
R
N−1 < θL. Hence, the constraint must
be binding not only for βh < 1 but also for βh = 1 and we can substitute xl into the
objective to obtain the simplified program:
max
βh,βl
θL + δSVN−1(βl) +
β − βl
βh − βl
δS[VN−1(βh)− VN−1(βl)] (36)
+(1−
β − βl
βh − βl
)δB
θL
∆θ
[UHN−1(βh)− U
H
N−1(βl)].
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Using our induction assumption we know that VN−1(βl) = VN−1(βh) = VN−1(0) = θLσ
S
N−1
and UHN−1(βl) = U
H
N−1(βh) = U
H
N−1(0) = ∆θσN−1 for all (βl, βh) such that βl ≤ βh ≤ β
R
N−1.
In all these cases, the seller’s payoff is identical to the one he can obtain by pooling via
the choice of βl = βh = β:
V poolN = θL + δSVN−1(0) = θLσ
S
N . (37)
Alternatively, the seller can separate the buyer’s types by choosing a (βl, βh) such that
βl < β < β
R
N−1 < βh. Because for all such (βl, βh) it holds that VN−1(βl) = θLσ
S
N−1 and
UHN−1(βh)− U
H
N−1(βl) = U
H
N−1(βh)−∆θσN−1 ≤ 0, this can be optimal only if VN−1(βh)−
VN−1(βl) = VN−1(βh)−θLσ
S
N−1 > 0. Moreover, because βl affects the seller’s program only
through its negative influence on β−βl
βh−βl
, it follows that if the seller chooses to separate,
then he must do so optimally with βl = 0. Hence we can define
β∗h ≡ arg max
βh∈(β
R
N−1
,1]
β
βh
δS[VN−1(βh)− θLσ
S
N−1] + (1−
β
βh
)δB
θL
∆θ
[UHN−1(βh)−∆θσN−1] (38)
and conclude that if the seller chooses to separate with N periods to go then he must do
so optimally with (βl, βh) = (0, β
∗
h) and x
∗
l = 1 − δBσN−1 + δB
UH
N−1
(β∗
h
)
∆θ
∈ (0, 1), resulting
in the payoff
V sepN = V
pool
N +
β
β∗h
δS[VN−1(β
∗
h)− θLσ
S
N−1] + (1−
β
β∗h
)δB
θL
∆θ
[UHN−1(β
∗
h)−∆θσN−1]. (39)
Define f(β) ≡ V sepN − V
pool
N . (1) f is continuous in β. (2) f(0) = δB
θL
∆θ
[UN−1(β
∗
h) −
∆θσN−1] < 0, because from above we know that VN−1(β
∗
h) > θLσ
S
N−1 which implies
that UHN−1(β
∗
h) < ∆θσN−1 (the seller can only gain from separation when the high type
buyer looses from it). (3) For the same reason, f is strictly increasing in β. Finally, (4)
f(βRN−1) > 0. To prove this last property, note that, by our induction assumption, for
β = βRN−1 and with N − 1 periods to go, the seller would be indifferent between pooling
forever and separating with some (βl, βh) = (0, β̃h). Hence
βRN−1 = β̃h
δB
θL
∆θ
[UHN−2(0)− U
H
N−2(β̃h)]
δS[VN−2(β̃h)− VN−2(0)] + δB
θL
∆θ
[UHN−2(0)− U
H
N−2(β̃h)]
. (40)
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Suppose that for β = βRN−1 and with N periods to go, the seller separates by inducing the
same posteriors (βl, βh) = (0, β̃h). By definition of β
∗
h, the seller’s payoff from separating
with (βl, βh) = (0, β̃h) must be (weakly) less than his payoff from separating with (βl, βh) =
(0, β∗h). Hence, f(β
R
N−1) > 0 if
βRN−1
β̃h
δS[VN−1(β̃h)− VN−1(0)] + (1−
βRN−1
β̃h
)δB
θL
∆θ
[UHN−1(β̃h)− U
H
N−1(0)] > 0. (41)
Substituting βRN−1 we find that this inequality holds if and only if
VN−1(β̃h)− VN−1(0)
VN−2(β̃h)− VN−2(0)
>
UHN−1(0)− U
H
N−1(β̃h)
UHN−2(0)− U
H
N−2(β̃h)
. (42)
The LHS measures how strongly the seller’s gain from learning increases with the number
of periods. It is increasing in the seller’s patience and therefore bounded from below by
limδS→δB
VN−1(β̃h)−VN−1(0)
VN−2(β̃h)−VN−2(0)
. For δS = δB continuation values must satisfy
VK(β) + U
H
K (β) = βσK + (1− β)θLσK (43)
because total available surplus is divided between the seller and the (high type) buyer.
Using this accounting identity for K = N − 1, N − 2 and β = β̃h we get
lim
δS→δB
VN−1(β̃h)− VN−1(0)
VN−2(β̃h)− VN−2(0)
=
β̃hU
H
N−1(0)− U
H
N−1(β̃h)
β̃hU
H
N−2(0)− U
H
N−2(β̃h)
. (44)
Finally,
β̃hU
H
N−1(0)− U
H
N−1(β̃h)
β̃hUHN−2(0)− U
H
N−2(β̃h)
≥
UHN−1(0)− U
H
N−1(β̃h)
UHN−2(0)− U
H
N−2(β̃h)
(45)
is equivalent to (1− β̃h)[U
H
N−2(0)U
H
N−1(β̃h)− U
H
N−1(0)U
H
N−2(β̃h)] ≥ 0 which holds because
the buyer’s gain in continuation value from the existence of one additional period is
maximized when the seller is as soft as possible, i.e., when
UH
N−1
(0)
UH
N−2
(0)
≥
UH
N−1
(β̃h)
UH
N−2
(β̃h)
. Hence, we
can conclude that f(βRN−1) > 0 and from properties (1)-(4) it follows that there must exist
a unique βRN ∈ (0, β
R
N−1) such that V
sep
N > V
pool
N if and only if β > β
R
N . This completes the
proof.
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Proof of Proposition 4. By induction over the number of periods N . Our analysis of
the two-period model has shown that for N = 2 the seller’s optimal mechanism satisfies
the properties described in Proposition 4. Assume that Proposition 4 holds for N − 1.
Suppose that there are N periods of trade and the seller’s prior is β ∈ [0, θL). Applying
Lemma 1, the seller optimally sets x∗h = 1 and chooses (xl, βl, βh) to solve the reduced
program in (15) with K = N . As this program is linear in xl ∈ [0, 1] it must hold that
x∗l ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., price-posting is optimal. For xl = 1 the seller’s payoff becomes
V poolN = θLσN , (46)
independently of the induced beliefs. For xl = 0 the constraint (16) requires that βh = 1
and it remains to solve the unconstrained program
max
βl∈[0,β]
β − βl
1− βl
[σN − δBU
H
N−1(βl)] +
1− β
1− βl
δSVN−1(βl). (47)
Consider first the case where β ≤ βSN−1. Because βl ≤ β, our induction assumption
implies that continuation values are given by VN−1(βl) = θLσN−1, U
H
N−1(βl) = ∆θσN−1,
and ULN−1(βl) = 0, i.e., continuation values are independent of βl. As δBU
H
N−1(βl) +
δSVN−1(βl) < σN the objective in (47) is therefore decreasing in βl ∈ [0, β]. It thus follows
that for β ≤ βSN−1 the solution to (47) is given by βl = 0 and it only remains to compare
the payoff from pooling, V poolN , with the payoff from full separation given by
V sepN (β) = β[σN − δB∆θσN−1] + (1− β)δSθLσN−1. (48)
Note that V sepN (β) is strictly increasing in β ∈ (0, β
S
N−1) with V
sep
N (0) = δSθLσN−1 < V
pool
N
and
V sepN (β
S
N−1) = V
pool
N−1 + β
S
N−1[δ
N−1
B − δB∆θδ
N−2
B ] + (1− β
S
N−1)δSθLδ
N−2
B (49)
= V poolN − θLδ
N−1
B + β
S
N−1θLδ
N−1
B + (1− β
S
N−1)δSθLδ
N−2
B > V
pool
N (50)
where we have used the fact that V poolN−1 = V
sep
N−1 = β
S
N−1[σN−1 − δB∆θσN−2] + (1 −
βSN−1)δSθLσN−2 by the definition of β
S
N−1. Hence there exists a β
S
N ∈ (0, β
S
N−1), given
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by the unique solution to V sepN (β) = V
pool
N , such that V
sep
N (β) > V
pool
N if and only if
β > βSN . For β ∈ (0, β
S
N ] the seller pools by choosing x
∗
l = 1, x
∗
h = 1, and β
∗
l = β
∗
h = β
whereas for β ∈ (βSN , β
S
N−1] the seller separates by choosing x
∗
l = 0, x
∗
h = 1, β
∗
l = 0, and
β∗h = 1. Moreover, for β > β
S
N−1 separation might not be optimal but dominates pooling.
Proof of Corollary 2: From a comparison of the payoffs (46) and (48) in the N -period
selling case we obtain
βSN =
θL[1− (δS − δB)σN−1]
1− θL(δS − δB)σN−1
(51)
and in the limit βS
∞
≡ limN→∞ β
S
N = θL
1−δS
1−δB−(δS−δB)θL
. In analogy to σN =
∑N−1
n=0 δ
n
B
define σSN ≡
∑N−1
n=0 δ
n
S. For the N -period renting case we can determine an upper bound
on βRN by comparing the seller’s payoff from pooling in (37) with his payoff from (full)
separation given by (39) with β∗h set equal to 1:
βRN ≤
θLδBσN−1
∆θδSσ
S
N−1 + θLδBσN−1
. (52)
Taking the limit we have that βR
∞
≡ limN→∞ β
R
N ≤ θL
δB(1−δS)
δS(1−δB)−θL(δS−δB)
. Hence βR
∞
< βS
∞
follows from
δB[(1− δB)− (δS − δB)θL] < δS(1− δB)− θL(δS − δB) ⇔ θL < 1. (53)
Moreover, βRN < β
S
N if
δBσN−1[1− θL(δS − δB)σN−1] < [1− (δS − δB)σN−1][∆θδSσ
S
N−1 + θLδBσN−1] (54)
⇔ δBσN−1(1− δSσ
S
N−1) < δSσ
S
N−1(1− δSσN−1). (55)
Note that each factor of the term on the RHS is larger than the corresponding factor on
the LHS. Hence, if 1−δSσN−1 > 0 ⇔ δS <
1
σN−1
then βRN < β
S
N . This completes the proof.
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